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Abstract—This article presents a survey of 278 intelligence 
analysts’ views of fully operational analytic technologies and 
their newly developed replacements. It was found that usability 
was an important concept in analysts’ reasons for and against 
using analytic tools. The perceived usability of a tool was not 
necessarily indicative of its perceived usefulness. Analysts’ 
decisions to recommend an analytic tool to others were best 
predicted by how usable analysts perceived the tool to be rather 
than how useful they considered the tool to be. These findings 
have implications for the development and implementation of 
new analytic technologies in the intelligence community. 
Keywords—Intelligence analysis; analytic technology; support 
systems; usability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents an empirical study of intelligence 
analysts’ perceptions of fully operational analytic tools and 
their newly developed replacements, in order to explore 
reasons for using and recommending some technologies but not 
others. In the first section of the paper, the types of tasks that 
analysts must perform and the sorts of tools that are available 
to them are outlined. This is followed by a review of literature 
on analytic technologies, and the importance of usability. Then, 
the methods and findings of the present study are presented. 
Finally, the implications of the findings are discussed, along 
with directions for future research. 
II. ANALYTIC TASKS AND TOOLS 
A. Technologies for the Analytic Workflow 
Intelligence analysts must search for, select, process and 
interpret data in order to understand a current situation or 
predict a future one that is of interest to stakeholders making 
strategic and tactical decisions. In short, analysis is a highly 
cognitive task [1]. This is made difficult partly because the 
human mind is limited in terms of attention, perception, 
memory and processing capacity, and partly because the task 
can be demanding due to large volumes of (often unstructured) 
data that can be (sometimes intentionally) misleading. 
Over the decades, in addition to providing analysts with 
training in analytic thinking, efforts have been made to support 
analysts by providing technology [e.g., 2, 3, 4, 5]. Indeed, there 
are currently a vast number of analytic tools available for use 
by the intelligence community. These can be used at different 
stages of the analytic workflow (see [1]) as they serve a variety 
of purposes. For instance, there are tools enabling generation of 
Gantt charts and process maps [e.g., 6, 7] which may be useful 
at the planning analytic response stage. At the obtain data 
stage, tools can be used to search for and mine data [e.g., 2, 8]. 
At the processing data stage, tools can be used to visualize data 
[e.g., 5, 9]. Tools can also be used to perform network analysis 
and geospatial analysis [e.g., 10, 11], support argumentation 
[e.g., 3, 12], support decision-making [e.g., 4, 13], and apply 
structured analytic techniques [e.g., 14]. Therefore, before 
tackling the demanding task of analysis, analysts must choose 
amongst a plethora of tools.  
B. Past Research on Analytic Tools 
There is a large literature on technology-based tools to 
support intelligence analysis. This includes that discussing the 
requirements for the design of tools and their evaluation [e.g., 
15, 16, 17, 18]. For instance, Elm et al. (2005)[15] devised a 
list of requirements for the development and evaluation of 
decision support systems, which they argue are lacking in most 
analytic tool suites. These requirements include observability, 
directability, teamwork, directed attention and resilience. 
However, Elm et al. did not validate these requirements using 
potential users (analysts). 
Scholtz (2005)[16] consulted an unspecified number of 
researchers and analysts before identifying higher- and lower-
level metrics for evaluating technology designed to support 
intelligence analysis in a number of ways. Higher-level metrics 
(e.g., quality of and confidence in the product, number of 
hypotheses explored, ratio of relevant to non-relevant material 
examined, and time taken) assess analyst process and product 
quality. Lower-level metrics (e.g., number of relevant 
documents/number of irrelevant documents produced, correct 
intra-information relationships identified, quality of system-
generated hypotheses, and time spent using each software 
function) assess whether software features improve that quality. 
The above metrics are meant to evaluate software that aims to 
increase effective data search; enhance analysts’ prior and tacit 
knowledge of the data; aid hypothesis generation and reduce 
confirmation bias; improve human-information interaction; and 
help analysts to work with big data. 
The requirements and metrics for analytic tools do not 
explicitly include the concept of usability, despite people’s 
preference for user-friendly technology (see [e.g., 19]. Indeed, 
The research presented in this paper was funded by HM Government. 
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usability can be a key element in the successful transition of 
new tools from the laboratory into operational use [17]. 
Although usability is a broadly defined concept, it typically 
includes reference to being easy or intuitive to use, as well as 
being attractive. However, Elm et al. (2004)[18] describe some 
analytic technologies as “user-hostile”.  
Intelligence analysis software development differs from 
commercial software development because the users (analysts) 
rarely decide what to purchase. The classified nature of the 
intelligence domain makes it difficult to identify and 
understand requirements. Political constraints also make 
feedback on software success or failure difficult to obtain [17]. 
In light of this, it is not unsurprising that there is little research 
on the factors that might be important in analysts’ decisions to 
select some specific tools to use rather than others.  
Researchers working on technologies in the intelligence 
community have often relied on non-analyst (e.g., student) 
samples to inform them [20, 21]. Past efforts to study analysts 
have typically involved small samples (for an exception see 
[21]). For example, Kelly et al. (2007)[23] used four 
intelligence analysts to identify evaluation criteria for analytical 
question answering systems. Clearly, employing small samples 
of users to inform tool development and evaluation is 
problematic as it precludes statistical analyses of the responses 
collected, making it difficult to draw reliable conclusions. In 
addition, the use of non-expert, unrepresentative samples 
means that the information gleaned lacks external validity and 
generalizability. The research described in this paper, therefore, 
aims to overcome this limitation by capturing the views of a 
large sample of intelligence analysts and analyzing their 
responses using relevant statistical tests.  
III. THE STUDY 
The main aim of the research was to explore intelligence 
analysts’ views of analytic tools. The objectives were to 
examine (1) analysts’ perceptions of the usability and 
usefulness of analytic tools; (2) their reasons for and against 
using tools; and (3) their willingness to recommend tools to 
others. These issues were investigated in the context of both 
fully operational analytic tools and their newly developed 
replacements. The latter were comparable to their operational 
counterparts in terms of readiness for use but were yet to be 
released at the time of the study. Comparing newly developed 
tools that will replace fully operational ones enables us to 
measure the extent to which developers have ‘learned’ from 
prior experiences of tool development and implementation. 
IV. METHOD 
A. Respondents 
Respondents were 278 UK intelligence analysts. Nearly all 
(93%) of the sample was employed to work full-time.
1
 On 
average, the sample had 6.15 (SD = 6.89) years of experience 
working in the intelligence community. Together, the sample 
was involved in a wide range of analytic tasks, including 
strategic and tactical ones. 
                                                          
1 Full demographic data was available for 242 respondents. 
B. Survey2 
Respondents were asked to complete a survey that asked 
about the usability and usefulness of analytic tools; their 
reasons for and against using these tools; and their willingness 
to recommend them to others. Responses to the two questions 
asking about usability and usefulness were each provided on 
10-point rating scales (with the higher ratings implying greater 
usability and usefulness). Responses to questions asking about 
reasons for and against using a tool were recorded as yes/no, as 
were responses to the question asking about willingness 
recommend a tool. Respondents were also asked to provide 
their demographic details (e.g., work status, and years of 
experience working in the intelligence community). 
The survey questions referred to four specific analytic tools 
(hereafter called Tools A, B, C and D).
3
 All of the tools 
enabled analysts to search for, and retrieve data. Thus, all of the 
tools would typically be used at the obtain data stage of the 
analytic workflow (see [1]). At the time of the research, Tools 
A and C were fully developed and operational. However, they 
would be eventually replaced by Tools B and D, respectively. 
Thus, it was possible to study the four tools as matched pairs 
(i.e., Tools A and B, Tools C and D).  
C. Data Collection Procedure 
The survey was advertised a week in advance of data 
collection on an intelligence organization’s intranet. The survey 
was then available online for a two-week period on the intranet. 
The survey was individually, self-administered during the 
respondents’ workday, and took approximately 15-20 minutes 
to complete. Participation was voluntary and anonymous.  
D. Data Analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed on data from 
respondents who provided responses on both tools in a pair. 
This provides a rigorous and sensitive comparison and 
eliminates the potential confounding effects of respondents’ 
demographic characteristics. 
V. FINDINGS 
A. Usability and Usefulness of Analytic Tools 
When comparing responses to Tools A and B (i.e., fully 
operational v. replacement), paired-samples t-tests revealed no 
statistically significant difference in respondents’ perceptions 
of their usability (Tool A: M = 7.17, SD = 1.96 and Tool B: M 
= 6.86, SD = 2.12), p > .05. However, respondents perceived 
Tool A to be significantly more useful than Tool B (Tool A: M 
= 7.32, SD = 1.94 and Tool B: M = 3.89, SD = 2.09), t[71] = 
10.41, p < .001.  
When comparing Tools C and D, a significant difference 
was found in both respondents’ perceptions of the usability 
and usefulness of the tools. Tool C (i.e., fully operational) was 
perceived to be easier to use than Tool D (i.e., replacement; 
Tool C: M = 7.57, SD = 2.14 and Tool D: M = 6.49, SD = 
2.54), t[75] = 3.48, p = .001. However, Tool D was perceived 
                                                          
2 A copy of the survey is available from the author. 
3 The tools cannot be identified because they are classified.   
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to be more useful than Tool C (Tool C: M = 5.70, SD = 2.35 
and Tool D: M = 6.93, SD = 1.97), t[75] = 3.66, p < .001.  
B. Reasons For and Against Using Analytic Tools 
According to McNemar tests, Tools A and B differed 
significantly (p ≤ .05) on some of the reasons for why 
respondents said they might (not) use them. Reasons for not 
using Tool B (the replacement) compared to Tool A (which 
was fully operational) were because: (1) respondents did not 
have a unique user account; (2) there was little technical 
support/training/user manual for it; (3) they did not understand 
the output it provided; and (4) it was difficult to use.  
Reasons for using Tool A compared to Tool B were 
because: (1) respondents had sufficient training; (2) it was a 
replacement for a tool they previously used; (3) it was 
compatible with other tools they use; (4) it contained the data 
they needed; (5) it allowed them to move data easily between 
tools; (6) it offered them a new way of looking at/thinking 
about the data; (7) they could alter the way results were 
displayed; (8) the output it provided was clear and simple; (9) 
it was easy to use; (10) it was fast; and (11) it looked ‘nice’. 
There were few differences between Tools C and D in 
terms of the reasons for why respondents said they might not 
use them. The reason for not using Tool D (the replacement) 
compared to Tool C (which was fully operational) was 
because respondents forgot it existed; suggesting a lack of in-
house marketing of the new tool and a lack of initial uptake. 
Tools C and D, however, differed significantly on several 
of the reasons for why respondents said they might use them. 
Reasons for using Tool C compared to Tool D were because: 
(1) respondents had sufficient training; (2) it was a 
replacement for a tool they previously used; (3) it was 
compatible with other tools they used; (4) it contained the data 
they needed; (5) it offered them a new way of looking 
at/thinking about the data; (6) they could alter the way results 
were displayed; and (7) it was easy to use. 
C. Recommending Analytic Tools 
McNemar tests revealed that there was no significant 
difference between Tools A and B in terms of whether or not 
respondents would recommend them to others: 88% said they 
would recommend Tool A and 80% said they would 
recommend Tool B, p > .05. Similarly, there was no 
significant difference between Tools C and D in terms of 
whether or not respondents would recommend them to others: 
90% said they would recommend Tool C and 83% said they 
would recommend Tool D, p > .05. 
Logistic regression models were computed to determine 
the relative power of respondents’ perceptions of the usability 
and usefulness of each tool in predicting respondents' 
willingness to recommend the tool to others.
4
 The perceived 
usability of Tool A, B and D significantly predicted 
respondents’ decisions to recommend each of these tools, with 
91%, 84% and 91% of decisions predicted correctly by the 
                                                          
4
 Sample sizes for the models predicting willingness to recommend each tool 
were: 235 for Tool A, 74 for Tool B, 195 for Tool C and 188 for Tool D. 
models, respectively. Respondents’ decisions to recommend 
Tool C were significantly predicted by both their perceptions 
of its usability and usefulness, with 93% of decisions correctly 
predicted by the model.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
This paper empirically examined intelligence analysts’ 
views of analytic tools that were fully operational as well as 
comparable ones that were newly developed replacements. 
Analysts’ reasons for using and recommending some 
technologies but not others were also explored. This provides 
an insight into why some analytic tools are more or less 
successfully ‘rolled out’ compared to others. Several findings 
emerged, and these are summarized and discussed below. 
First, the lack of usability can be an important barrier to 
analysts using analytic tools. The study found that analysts’ 
reasons for not using a tool were because there was little 
technical support/training/user manual for it; they did not 
understand the output it provided; and it was difficult to use. 
By contrast, analysts’ reported using a tool because they had 
sufficient training; the output it provided was clear and simple; 
and it was easy to use. Thus, usability should be a key 
requirement for the design of analytic tools. While this may 
appear to be an obvious observation, analytic technologies, 
beyond those studied here, are often criticized for not being 
user-friendly [18].  
Second, one of the newly developed replacement tools 
(D) was perceived to be less user friendly than its fully 
operational counterpart (Tool C), and although one might 
argue that this simply reflects the former tool’s stage of 
development, it does underscore the problem that developers 
do not necessarily consider usability as a key requirement for 
tool development. Rather than viewing usability as integral 
part to tool development, it is sometimes seen as an ‘add on.’ 
Building in usability at later stages of development, however, 
can be difficult, and may sometimes even be overlooked if 
time and resources are limited. 
Third, the perceived usability of a technology is not 
synonymous with its perceived usefulness (or effectiveness). 
Although analytic tools may be considered to be equally 
usable, they may differ in their perceived usefulness and vice, 
versa. In the comparison of Tools C and D, it was found that 
although analysts perceived the newly developed replacement 
tool (D) to be more useful than its fully operational 
counterpart (Tool C), they considered the latter tool to be more 
usable. Ideally, tools ought to be both useful and usable, and 
there should not be a trade-off between these two concepts.  
Fourth, analysts’ decisions to recommend three of the 
four tools studied were predicted only by their perceived 
usability (and not by their perceived usefulness). Most 
intelligence organizations do not dictate which tools analysts 
should use, but rather provide them with a selection, thus 
analysts are at liberty to choose amongst tools fulfilling the 
same function. Given that word-of-mouth is generally an 
effective advertising strategy, the decisions to recommend 
tools purely based on their perceived usability poses a threat to 
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the successful implementation of potentially useful tools that 
are considered by analysts (users) to be less usable. 
Finally, other reasons for why analysts chose to use a tool 
included that it was a replacement for a tool they previously 
used; it was compatible with other tools they currently use; it 
offered a new way of looking at/thinking about the data; they 
could alter the way the results were displayed; and it contained 
the data they needed. Thus, when designing new analytic 
technologies, developers ought to consider how tools are 
currently being used and how new tools either supplant or 
complement them. In addition, developers ought to ensure that 
new tools allow users to interact with them in different ways. 
For example, some analysts might prefer to put data into 
tabular form whereas others may prefer a graph or chart. 
Developers also need to be aware of how analysts are 
currently solving analytic tasks, so new technologies can not 
only aid analytic thinking, but also improve it.  
Given that the issue of usability crops up consistently in 
analysts’ perceptions and experiences of tools, there is a need 
for future research to better understand this concept from the 
perspective of the analytic community. Future research could 
also explore how individual features of this multi-faceted 
concept determine analysts’ perceptions of available tools. As 
with other recent efforts to move towards an evidence-based 
approach to intelligence analysis (see [24]), there ought to be 
an evidence-based approach to analytic technology. The 
findings of such research can be used to inform the design and 
development of tools that meet analysts’ requirements.  
There are, however, some challenges to developing user-
friendly tools, even when one has access to large, 
representative samples of intelligence analysts. For instance, 
inevitably, users may disagree on what is usable (e.g., more 
experienced analysts may have different perspectives from less 
experienced ones, and more tech savvy analysts may differ 
from the less technologically capable counterparts).  
In sum, there is a need for better communication between 
developers of analytic tools and users (analysts) to guarantee 
that support systems address the concerns of users and 
promote the development and survival of the most effective 
and user-friendly tools. The potentially increased costs and 
time required to develop such tools may be counter-balanced 
by the reduced user training and support costs and time, and 
the lower likelihood of needing to re-develop a tool.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Thank you to Ian Belton for his Research Assistance and 
to Kathryn Careless and Paul Jones for providing feedback on a 
draft of the manuscript. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Dhami, M. K., & Careless, K. (2015).Ordinal structure of the generic 
analytic workflow: A survey of intelligence analysts. 2015 European 
Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, 141-144. DOI: 
10.1109/EISIC.2015.37 
[2] Ahn, J-W., Brusilovsky, P., Grady, J., He, D., & Florian, R. (2010). 
Semantic annotation based exploratory search for information analysts. 
Information Processing & Management, 46, 383-402. 
DOI:10.1016/j.ipm.2010.02.001 
[3] Chopra, K., & Haimson, C. (2005). Information fusion for intelligence 
analysis. In Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences (HICSS) 2005 (p. 111a). DOI: 
10.1109/HICSS.2005.316 
[4] Hayes, C. C. (2008). An intelligence application providing multiple 
coordinated data views. Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 52, 610-614. DOI: 
10.1177/154193120805200706 
[5] Stasko, J., Görg, C., Liu, Z., & Singhal, K. (2007). Jigsaw: Supporting 
investigative analysis through interactive visualization. In W. Ribarsky 
& J. Dill (Eds.), IEEE Symposium on Visual Analytics Science and 
Technology (VAST) 2007 (pp. 131-138). DOI: 
10.1109/VAST.2007.4389006 
[6] www.gantt.com/ 
[7] www.lucidchart.com 
[8] de Boer, M., van Maanen, P., & Vreeswijk, G. (2013). Supporting 
intelligence analysts with a trust-based question-answering system. In 
IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence (WI) and 
Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT) 2013 (pp. 183-186). DOI 
10.1109/WI-IAT.2013.179 
[9] www.palantir.com/products/ 
[10] www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/analysts-notebook 
[11] www.esri.com/ 
[12] Pioch, N. J., & Everett, J. O. (2006). POLESTAR: Collaborative 
knowledge management and sensemaking tools for intelligence analysts. 
In Proceedings of the 15th ACM International Conference on 
Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM 2006) (pp. 513-521). 
DOI: 10.1145/1183614.1183688 
[13] Svenson, P., Forsgren, R., Kylesten, B., Berggren, P., Fah, W. R., Choo, 
M. S., & Hann, J. K. Y. (2010). Swedish-Singapore studies of Bayesian 
Modelling techniques for tactical intelligence analysis. In 13th 
Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION) 2010 (pp. 1-8). Retrieved 
from 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=5706806 
[14] www2.parc.com/istl/projects/ach/ach.html 
[15] Elm, W., Potter, S., Tittle, J., Woods, D., Grossman, J., & Patterson, E. 
(2005). Finding decision support requirements for effective intelligence 
analysis tools. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society Annual Meeting, 49, 297-301. DOI: 
10.1177/154193120504900318 
[16] Scholtz, J. (2005). Metrics for evaluation of software technology to 
support intelligence analysis. Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 49, 918-921. DOI: 
10.1177/154193120504901010 
[17] Geitz, S., Moon, B., D’Amico, A., Hoffman, R. R., & Page, R. (2005). 
Beyond requirements: Improving software tools for intelligence analysts. 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual 
Meeting, 49, 932-935. DOI: 10.1177/154193120504901013 
[18] Elm, W. C., Cook, M. J., Greitzer, F. L., Hoffman, R. R., Moon, B., & 
Hutchins, S. G. (2004). Designing support for intelligence analysts. 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual 
Meeting, 48, 406-410. DOI: 10.1177/154193120404800328 
[19] Norman, D. A. (2002). The design of everyday things. Basic Books. 
[20] Kang, Y., Görg, C., & Stasko, J. (2009). Evaluating visual analytics 
systems for investigative analysis: Deriving design principles from a 
case study. In J. Stasko & J.J. van Wijk (Eds.), IEEE Conference on 
Visual Analytics Science and Technology (VAST) 2009 (pp. 139-146). 
DOI: 10.1109/VAST.2009.5333878 
[21] Kang, Y., & Stasko, J. (2011). Characterizing the intelligence analysis 
process: Informing visual analytics design through a longitudinal field 
study. In G. Santucci & M. Ward (Eds.), IEEE Conference on Visual 
Analytics Science and Technology (VAST) 2011 (pp. 21-30). DOI: 
10.1109/VAST.2011.6102438 
[22] Berardi, C. W., Solovey, E. T., & Cummings, M. L. (2013). 
Investigating the efficacy of network visualizations for intelligence 
tasks. In K. Glass et al. (Eds.), 2013 IEEE International Conference on 
Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) (pp. 278-283). DOI: 
10.1109/ISI.2013.6578843 
Dhami, M. K. (2017). A survey of intelligence analysts’ perceptions of analytic tools. 2017 European Intelligence and Security 
Informatics Conference, 131-134. DOI: 10.1109/EISIC.2017.26 
 
 
 
[23] Kelly, D., Wacholder, N., Rittman, R., Sun, Y., Kantor, P., Small, S., & 
Strzalkowski, T. (2007). Using interview data to identify evaluation 
criteria for interactive, analytical question-answering systems. Journal of 
the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 58(7), 
1032-1043. DOI: 10.1002/asi.20575 
[24] Dhami, M. K., Mandel, D. R., Mellers, B., & Tetlock, P. (2015). 
Improving intelligence analysis with decision science. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 10, 753-757. 
 
